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Public authority liability for negligence has long been a vexed question in tort law. 
Following the Ipp Review of 2002, it has been further complicated by the introduction in 
most Australian states of a form of ‘policy defence’, designed to reduce authorities’ 
exposure to liability through lowered standards of care modelled on public law concepts. 
This article analyses the disparate provisions in light of their recent judicial interpreta-
tion, highlighting the problems and uncertainties they create, their wide variation in form 
and their infidelity to the original proposals on which they are based. It advocates a 
return to the drawing board and canvasses two potential solutions that now merit more 
detailed consideration — either a wholesale reversion to the common law; or the 
enactment in uniform legislation of a single, cautiously deferential approach to liability 
for discretionary public body decisions, which mimics the approach to other types of 
specialised, expert decision in private law. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
Public authority liability for negligence has long been a complex area of the 
common law, but its convolution has been further exacerbated in recent years 
by the raft of statutory provisions enacted in Australia in the wake of the 2002 
Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (‘Ipp Review’).1 The Ipp Review 
itself was commissioned by Commonwealth, state and territory governments 
as a reaction to the spiralling cost of liability insurance — a phenomenon that 
was itself (not uncontroversially)2 attributed to the unpredictability of 
negligence law. The Ipp Review Panel was tasked with finding ways to curtail 
the problem by ‘developing consistent national approaches’3 to negligence 
liability as a whole. Within this remit, one of its more specific terms of 
reference was to ‘address the principles applied in negligence to limit the 
liability of public authorities’.4 
 
 1 Panel of Eminent Persons, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002). 
 2 Doubts are now expressed about the extent to which the Australian insurance crisis was ever 
really a product of negligence liabilities as opposed to canny political lobbying: see, eg, Kylie 
Burns, ‘Distorting the Law: Politics, Media and the Litigation Crisis — An Australian Per-
spective’ (2007) 15 Torts Law Journal 195; Rob Davis, ‘The Tort Reform Crisis’ (2002) 25 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 865; Harold Luntz, ‘Reform of the Law of Negli-
gence: Wrong Questions — Wrong Answers’ (2002) 25 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 836. Since the implementation of the reforms, public liability insurance premium 
rates have certainly dropped: see Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, Overview of 
Professional Indemnity and Public and Product Liability Insurance, June 2013. But it is unclear 
whether this is due to lower tort liabilities, or simply a more general recovery of  
insurance markets. 
 3 Helen Coonan, ‘Ministerial Meeting on Public Liability’ (Joint Communique, 30 May 2002). 
 4 Ipp Review, above n 1, ix. 
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The Panel’s ultimate recommendation was for the introduction of a so-
called statutory ‘policy defence’5 for public authorities throughout all Austral-
ian jurisdictions. The proposed ‘defence’ was not intended to provide com-
plete immunity against civil liability, but instead to lower the standard of care 
required of authorities in respect of certain types of ‘policy’ decision; that is, 
conscious decisions based substantially on ‘financial, economic, political or 
social factors’, made in the performance or non-performance of their public 
functions.6 The standard proposed borrowed its terminology from the public 
law concept of reasonableness stipulated in Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation (‘Wednesbury’),7 so that liability for a 
policy decision would arise only if the decision was so unreasonable that no 
reasonable public authority could have made it.8 
This recommendation proved to be the catalyst for a subsequent wave of 
uncoordinated and inconsistent law reform across Australia, much of which 
has shown little fidelity to the spirit or detail of the Panel’s original proposals. 
The result is that not only is there now no single approach to the question of 
public body negligence liability in Australia, but such legislative provisions as 
have been introduced bear little resemblance to the proposals on which they 
were apparently based. In some jurisdictions (South Australia and the 
Northern Territory), no special policy defence has been enacted at all and the 
negligence liability of public authorities continues to be regulated  
exclusively by common law principles.9 The result is an unpalatable farrago of  
disparate norms. 
Some might regard this hodgepodge of rules as understandable in a federal 
system, but it is clearly not in accord with the proclaimed preferences of 
governments in the run-up to the Ipp Review. At best, the random result can 
 
 5 In jurisdictions implementing the recommendation, it has not been construed as providing a 
defence as such, but rather an additional statutory hurdle that must be overcome in order to 
establish liability: see, eg, Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd 
(2009) 77 NSWLR 360, 434 [360] (Campbell JA) (‘Refrigerated Roadways’). 
 6 See Ipp Review, above n 1, 153–4 [10.12]. 
 7 [1948] 1 KB 223; Ipp Review, above n 1, 157–8 [10.27]. 
 8 Ipp Review, above n 1, 157–8 [10.26] (recommendation 39). 
 9 In South Australia, there is one exception that is specific to public bodies, relating to the 
liability of road traffic authorities under Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) s 42. Other statutes also 
affect public bodies in the same way that they affect the liability of private parties, eg the 
limitation Acts. The Northern Territory government’s response to the Ipp Review recommen-
dations is found in the Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT) and the Personal Inju-
ries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT). Neither of these statutes address public  
authority liability. 
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be regarded as a pragmatic sacrifice of original preferences to the exigencies 
of the time, and to the perceived need for governments to make swift, 
unilateral, visible, public responses to crisis. At worst, however, it is irrational 
for governments to emphasise the importance of national consistency on the 
one hand, and then to legislate multilaterally, without regard to this aim, on 
the other. In our view, it is also undesirable as a matter of moral principle that 
the private interests of Australian citizens which are as basic as the integrity of 
their person, property and economic welfare should receive radically different 
protection in negligence law from state to state. It is not, however, strictly 
necessary to take this view for one to react sceptically to the recent wave of 
reforms, as we intend to show. Sadly, they contain sufficient deficiencies and 
interpretive difficulties to justify independent criticism in their own right. 
In this article, we explore the problems inherent in the various statutory 
provisions now governing public body liability in Australia and recommend a 
return to the drawing board. We argue that, whilst the negligence liability of 
public bodies was certainly never straightforward at common law, the recent 
reforms have further confused, convoluted and fragmented matters to an 
unacceptable degree — to such an extent, indeed, that we should now 
seriously consider either discarding them entirely; or reengaging with the 
field in a concerted way that is likely to produce a more uniform,  
rational solution. 
Part II of the article describes the common law background against which 
the Ipp Review proposals and subsequent statutory reforms are set. The 
purpose here is to identify some of the difficulties, but also some of the 
sophistications of the original, common law approach to public body liability. 
This serves as a backdrop to our discussion of the Ipp Review’s proposed 
‘policy defence’ in Part III. Part IV then critically appraises the various 
legislative responses to the Ipp Review in light of their recent judicial interpre-
tation. It details the extent of the legislation’s inconsistencies, interpretive 
difficulties and infidelities to the Ipp Review vision and illustrates the prob-
lematic state of the current law when viewed from either the microscopic or 
macroscopic point of view. 
Part V advocates a return to the drawing board. Our aim in this final, 
concluding part is not to set out a fully developed proposal for reform, but to 
state clearly the reasons why there is a need for change, and to canvas two 
possible solutions that now merit further serious consideration. Without a 
proper dénouement of the problems of the field as it stands, there is little 
prospect of governments making any change, not least because their own 
interests are captured. The first option for reform involves a more concerted 
and careful process of uniform legislation that would endorse a single, 
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cautiously deferential approach to negligence liability for discretionary public 
decisions, mimicking the approach that courts currently take toward other 
types of specialised, expert decision in private law. This approach assumes a 
Diceyan view of the relationship between citizen and State and therefore sits 
comfortably with the traditions of Australian private law.10 It also, however, 
assumes the possibility of national consensus between governments on 
matters of liability that affect their budgets and behaviour, which is a weaker 
premise. The second, more pragmatic solution is to completely abolish all 
existing versions of the ‘policy defence’ and return the question of public body 
liability for negligence entirely to the wardship of the common law. This may 
seem an extreme and startling suggestion — one that returns us, full circle, to 
our starting point — but it is one that may well be warranted, we suggest, by 
the difficulties that the legislation currently presents. 
II   P U B L I C  AU T H O R I T Y  N E G L I G E N C E :   
T H E  CO M M O N  LAW  B AC KG R O U N D 
Prior to the Ipp Review, the negligence liability of public authorities in 
Australia was regulated almost entirely by the common law.11 This remains 
the case in South Australia and the Northern Territory.12 Furthermore, the 
common law remains relevant even in those jurisdictions where statutory 
reform has occurred, because the reforms do not codify the law, but merely 
supplement and modify the common law approach. 
One point that does not seem to have been fully appreciated by the gov-
ernments that commissioned the Ipp Review is that public authority liability 
for negligence has always been limited to a significant degree by the tradition-
al requirements that a plaintiff prove the existence and breach of a duty of 
care. In fact, courts’ willingness to impose legal duties of care on public 
 
 10 The basic vision appears in A V Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 7th ed, 1908); 
see especially at 189–91, 198–9. For reference to some of the necessary exceptions that finesse 
the base principle of equality, see Peter W Hogg and Patrick J Monahan, Liability of the 
Crown (Carswell, 3rd ed, 2000) 1–4 [1.2]. The Diceyan view strongly underpins the form of 
most statutes abolishing Crown immunities in Australia. For the history, see Paul Finn, 
‘Claims against the Government Legislation’ in P D Finn (ed), Essays on Law and Government 
(Law Book Co, 1996) vol 2, 25. 
 11 See generally Cherie Booth and Dan Squires, The Negligence Liability of Public Authorities 
(Oxford University Press, 1st ed, 2006); William Wade and Christopher Forsyth, Administra-
tive Law (Oxford University Press, 10th ed, 2009) 648–62; Peter Cane, Administrative Law 
(Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2011) 201–10. 
 12 See above n 9. 
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authorities has historically been constrained by a number of serious judicial 
concerns attending an authority’s status and functions. These relate to: (i) the 
‘justiciability’ of certain types of discretionary public policy decision involv-
ing the allocation of resources between competing social ends;13 (ii) the fact 
that a body’s failure may consist of a ‘pure omission’ to prevent harm more 
immediately caused by a third party or natural hazard;14 (iii) the potential 
incompatibility of any duty of care with the intentions and purposes of a 
statute under which the public body acts;15 (iv) the apprehension that the duty 
may induce ‘defensive practices’, or place decision-makers in impossible 
positions of legal or ethical conflict between competing responsibilities;16 (v) 
worries that ‘indeterminate’ or ‘massive’ liabilities might result from a single, 
wrong decision;17 (vi) the need to ensure that negligence law develops 
coherently with other legal principles (including other principles of private 
law, but also public law processes for the review of decisions through statutory 
appeals and judicial review);18 and (vii) a concern — voiced in increasingly 
strong terms by the High Court of Australia in recent years — that an 
appropriate balance is struck between the responsibility of public agencies to 
protect individuals and the latter’s duty19 to look out for themselves.20 
Limiting public body liabilities so as coherently to incorporate respect for 
all of these concerns has admittedly not been without its difficulties. The 
appropriateness of some of these has been questioned21 and their influence 
upon courts’ reasoning on duty questions can produce law with soft edges. 
The concerns about the ‘justiciability’ of public decisions and the ‘consistency’ 
 
 13 See, eg, Booth and Squires, above n 11, 29–31. 
 14 Ibid 14–15. 
 15 See, eg, Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 581 [55], 585 [62] (‘Sullivan’). 
 16 See, eg, ibid 582 [60]. 
 17 See, eg, ibid 582–3 [60]–[63]. 
 18 See, eg, ibid 581 [54]; X v South Australia [No 3] [2007] SASC 125 (5 April 2007)  
[196] (Debelle J). 
 19 Or sometimes, their liberty. See, eg, Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 248 [87] 
(Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) (‘Stuart’) where a duty on the part of the police to detain a 
person contemplating suicide was considered inconsistent with the latter’s freedom of choice. 
 20 Amaca Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2004) 132 LGERA 309, 339 [156] (Ipp JA) (‘Amaca’). 
 21 See, eg, Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police Force [1996] 3 WLR 968, 984–5 
(Hirst LJ); Van Colle v CC Hertfordshire [2008] UKHL 50 [49] (Lord Bingham). The concern 
about ‘defensive practice’ is one of the most persistently controversial, not least because it is 
based upon assumptions about behaviour that have not been empirically tested. For an 
alternative construction, see Hanna Wilberg, ‘Defensive Practice or Conflict of Duties? Policy 
Concerns in Public Authority Negligence Claims’ (2010) 126 Law Quarterly Review 420. 
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of a duty of care with a body’s statutory purposes have proven especially 
difficult to meet with bright line rules.22 In part, this is because the justiciabil-
ity question itself has two, distinct aspects in judicial thinking that are easily 
conflated — one relating to courts’ constitutional reluctance to second-guess 
public body decisions regarding distributive choices carrying the public 
mandate;23 the other relating to their practical incapacity to determine what a 
public body should have done, given their own lack of experience and 
expertise in distributive or resourcing questions, the subjective and open-
textured nature of some of the discretionary standards placed at issue, the 
informational constraints that attend the private law system,24 and the 
polycentric nature of some of the decisions in question.25 Similarly, the 
question whether a duty of care is ‘compatible’ with a body’s statutory 
purposes inevitably requires the ‘intention’ of the relevant statute to be 
inferred, often from very general broad-brush descriptions of a body’s public 
functions. This process of interpretation is slippery and often unpredictable. 
At the breach stage, courts run into similar difficulties in determining the 
proper standard of care to apply to public body decisions, especially where the 
decision involves the balancing of competing demands on scarce resources.26 
There is also a more fundamental, destabilising question — on which views 
can reasonably differ — as to whether public bodies should in principle be 
expected to take less care than a private individual, more care, or (the Diceyan 
view) be treated in as nearly as possible the same way. On the one hand, it is 
arguable that they should be held to lower standards, because they are tasked 
with undertaking actions that benefit society as a whole, as opposed to 
particular individuals.27 Unlike most private actors, they also have little choice 
 
 22 For an excellent analysis see Booth and Squires, above n 11, ch 2. 
 23 That which would ‘imperil the devolution of responsibility from the legislature’: Crimmins v 
Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 62 [170] (Gummow J) (‘Crim-
mins’); Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 553–4 [6] (Gleeson CJ) 
(‘Graham Barclay Oysters’). 
 24 Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1970] AC 1004, 1067 (Lord Diplock) (‘Dorset Yacht’); 
Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 1, 13 [5] (Gleeson CJ); Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 
CLR 512, 628–9 [310]–[312] (Hayne J) (‘Brodie’). On the distinction between these two 
forms of argument, see Booth and Squires, above n 11, 33–41; Mark Aronson, ‘Government 
Liability in Negligence’ (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 44, 56–8. 
 25 See Lon L Fuller and Kenneth I Winston, ‘The Form and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) 92 
Harvard Law Review 353, 393–404. 
 26 See, eg, Refrigerated Roadways (2009) 77 NSWLR 360, 433 (Campbell JA). Whether this 
difficulty goes to duty or to breach apparently depends on how generalised it is likely to be in 
respect of the sort of decision the authority is engaged in: at 418–19 [283]. 
 27 Kit Barker et al, The Law of Torts in Australia (Oxford University Press, 5th ed, 2012) 584–5. 
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about whether or not to discharge their functions and so are unable to avoid 
the constraints of their own limited resources by abstaining from risk-bearing 
activity.28 On the other hand, it is sometimes suggested that they should be 
held to a higher, altruistic standard since, unlike most private actors, they 
operate for the benefit of others without regard to self-interest.29 On this view, 
public bodies are akin to trusted private fiduciaries, to whom stricter legal 
standards are applied in managing the affairs of others. 
A third view is that, where discretionary decision-making about resources 
is involved, they should be treated in the same way as highly skilled or 
specialised private actors, such as doctors. After all, doctors too regularly face 
complex decisions about competing priorities and resource distribution, and 
may sometimes have no practical choice other than to act in one way or 
another. On this view, the rule in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee (‘Bolam’) is the logical standard to apply to public body resourcing 
decisions at common law,30 as a measure of practical deference to the special 
knowledge of experts, the difficulties of the field and the importance of not 
stifling innovation, with the consequence that such decisions should be 
adjudged reasonable provided they comply with ‘a responsible body’ of expert 
opinion held by equivalent public decision-makers, in respect of which the 
court is satisfied there is a rational evidential basis.31 This standard lies 
 
 28 Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 512, 623 [295] (Hayne J). 
 29 P Vines, ‘Straddling the Public/Private Divide: Tortious Liability of Public Authorities’ (2010) 
9 Judicial Review 445, 449. 
 30 For vestiges of this approach in the context of a broader appeal to the standard norms of 
negligence law see S H Bailey and M J Bowman, ‘The Policy/Operational Dichotomy — A 
Cuckoo in the Nest’ (1986) 45 Cambridge Law Journal 430, 435–6. The test derives from 
McNair J’s judgment in Bolam [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587, which held that a practitioner is not 
negligent if acting ‘in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of 
medical men skilled in that particular art…’ Bolam was rejected in Australia in the context of 
a doctor’s informational duties in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 and in respect of 
treatment and diagnosis decisions in Naxakis v Western General Hospital (1999) 197 CLR 
269. It has also now been rejected in the United Kingdom in respect of a doctor’s informa-
tional duties in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] AC 1430, 1462–3 [85]–[88] 
(Lords Kerr and Reed JJSC). Note, however, that a standard analogous to Bolam now applies 
in relation to all professional duties (other than the duty to warn of the risk of harm) in civil 
liability legislation in most states: Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 22; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(NSW) s 5O; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 59; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 22. Western Austral-
ia’s provision only applies to health practitioners: Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5PB. The 
Australian Capital Territory has no provision. 
 31 The qualification reserves the ultimate judgement to the court: Bolitho v City and Hackney 
Health Authority [1998] AC 232. This is also the design of the statutory provisions listed: see 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 22; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5O; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) 
s 59; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 22. 
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halfway between that applied to ‘non-expert’ tasks like driving a car, where 
the defendant must comply with the predominant approach of reasonable 
peers, and the more exacting standards required of fiduciaries, some of whose 
prudential management duties (such as the duty to avoid conflicts of interest) 
tend to be strict. 
Historically, these complex concerns have resulted in limited liabilities for 
public bodies at common law, which makes it unlikely, we suggest in the next 
section, that further statutory intervention was ever actually necessary to 
curtail overly extensive liabilities in respect of discretionary decision-making. 
It is, however, true to say that the difficulties of the field have left courts 
struggling to articulate entirely predictable rules. In the United Kingdom 
(‘UK’), judges at one time sought to accommodate ‘justiciability’ concerns at a 
logically distinct, separate stage of negligence proceedings, prior even to 
considering whether or not any duty of care was owed by an authority on the 
facts. This they did by adverting to a distinction between ‘policy’ decisions 
(presumptively non-justiciable) on the one hand, and ‘operational’ failings 
(presumptively justiciable) on the other.32 They also experimented with ruling 
out negligence liability entirely in respect of discretionary decisions unless 
there had been a clear violation of public law standards.33 Both of these 
approaches have declined in popularity in recent years: the justiciability 
question is now generally viewed as simply one part of the duty of care 
inquiry conducted on individual sets of facts (not a prior ‘in/out’ question);34 
and the distinction between ‘policy’ and ‘operation’ has been recognised as 
being far from watertight.35 Consequently, courts now tend to ask and answer 
the question of justiciability directly in its own terms, rather than by mediat-
ing it through any hard and fast policy/operation ‘rule’.36 The use of public law 
 
 32 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 754 (Lord Wilberforce) (‘Anns’). See 
also X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 737–8 (Lord Browne-
Wilkinson) (‘X v Bedfordshire’). 
 33 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 (‘Stovin’). There has since been a retreat from this approach: 
Barrett v Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550 (‘Barrett’); Phelps v Hillingdon 
London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619 (‘Phelps’). See also Booth and Squires, above n 11, 
49–58. 
 34 Booth and Squires, above n 11, 29, criticise any such change, contending that justiciability 
should always be determined as a prior question. 
 35 This was recognised even by Lord Wilberforce, who is credited with introducing the 
distinction into English law: see Anns [1978] AC 728, 755. See also below n 36. 
 36 Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1988] 1 AC 473, 501 (Lord Keith); Stovin [1996] AC 923, 
951–2 (Lord Hoffmann), 938–9 (Lord Nicholls); Barrett [2001] 2 AC 550, 571–2 (Lord 
Slynn), 583 (Lord Hutton); Phelps [2001] 2 AC 619, 658 (Lord Slynn), 665 (Lord Nicholls), 
673–4 (Lord Clyde). For the various criticisms of the distinction and the reasons why UK 
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criteria as a protective shield in negligence proceedings has also waned — a 
point that is significant precisely because the Ipp Review’s proposed ‘policy 
defence’ was, as we shall see, constructed around this type of approach. 
The result of these developments in the UK is that, nowadays, only a ‘nar-
row band of high-level decisions are considered … to be completely out of 
bounds’ by English courts, with the vast majority of cases being considered 
through the lens of ‘ordinary negligence principles’.37 To the extent that judges 
worry about negligence liabilities impinging unduly on discretionary ‘public’ 
decision-making, they prefer simply to check a duty of care’s consistency with 
the background ‘statutory framework’, and with apparent legislative ‘inten-
tions’ regarding the availability of a private law cause of action.38 This may 
have resulted in more cases going to trial and in more detailed judicial 
scrutiny of public body decisions, which is no doubt unattractive to public 
authorities, but also consistent, we would suggest, with the basic, Diceyan 
conception of the rule of law. 
In Australia, courts have also sometimes attempted to gauge the justiciabil-
ity of public body decisions by reference to the policy/operation distinction,39 
 
courts have steered away from it in recent years under the influence of the European Court of 
Human Rights: see Cane, above n 11, 213–21. 
 37 Donal Nolan, ‘Governmental Liability’ in Ken Oliphant (ed), The Law of Tort (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths, 2007) 893. 
 38 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] 1 WLR 1057, 1077–8 [71] (Lord 
Scott) (‘Gorringe’). See also Stovin [1996] AC 923, 935–6 (Lord Nicholls). To the extent that 
Stovin suggested that the existence of a common law cause of action depends on positive 
legislative intention to this effect, it is dubious. The modern approach in Australia is different 
(and, we suggest, correct), asking instead whether a cause of action is clearly intended to be 
excluded by the Act: see below n 52. 
 39 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 442 (Gibbs CJ) (‘Heyman’). It is 
generally the implied intention of the statute in question to preclude liability for policy deci-
sions: at 500 (Deane J). In doing so, the statute distinguishes between ‘decisions which involve 
or are dictated by financial, economic, social or political factors or constraints … budgetary 
allocations and the constraints which they entail in terms of allocation of resources’ on the 
one hand, and ‘action or inaction that is merely the product of administrative direction, 
expert or professional opinion, technical standards or general standards of reasonableness’ on 
the other: at 468–9 (Mason J). Cautious reference to the distinction is also made in more 
recent cases: Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 358–9 [67]–[68] (Toohey J), 
425–6 [253] (Kirby J) (‘Pyrenees’). But see Gummow J’s rejection of the distinction as unhelp-
ful: at 393 [182]. See also Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 1, 50 [131] (McHugh J), 101 [292] 
(Hayne J); Graham Barclay Oysters (2002) 211 CLR 540, 556–7 [12] (Gleeson CJ). By contrast 
with Mason J’s view in Heyman, Gummow J in Pyrenees preferred to isolate only ‘quasi-
legislative’ decisions as non-justiciable, leaving budgetary and resource questions to be en-
gaged at the breach stage: at 393–4 [182]–[183]. 
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but they now also regard the distinction as only being ‘of some use’.40  
By contrast, the bold use of public law criteria to restrict negligence actions 
never really took off, having been expressly disapproved by McHugh J in 
Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (‘Crimmins’) as inappo-
site, given the very different rationales of public and private law actions.41 The 
result is that, in the great majority of cases, the various policy concerns we 
have mentioned above have been dealt with flexibly and sensitively at the duty 
and breach stages of the negligence inquiry, as they are in the UK.42 
As regards duty, Australian courts now approach novel cases in a granular, 
fact-specific way, having regard to a wide variety of salient features or 
factors.43 These include: (i) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff;44 (ii) the 
extent of the authority’s power, or control over the risk;45 (iii) the defendant’s 
knowledge (actual, or possibly constructive) of the risk;46 (iv) whether the 
decision in question is one that is capable of being resolved judicially, in the 
 
 40 Refrigerated Roadways (2009) 77 NSWLR 360, 413 [259] (Campbell JA). 
 41 (1999) 200 CLR 1, 35–6 [82]–[83]. 
 42 The exception may be where the concern about justiciability is clearly of the type where it is 
still suggested that it may be appropriate for courts to consider it in its own terms before any 
debate about the existence of a duty of care arises: see Electro Optic Systems Pty Ltd v New 
South Wales (2014) 10 ACTLR 1, 48 [210] (Jagot J) (‘Electro Optic Systems’). See also 
Meshlawn Pty Ltd v Queensland [2010] QCA 181 (20 July 2010) [70]–[72]  
(Chesterman JA) (‘Meshlawn’). 
 43 A popular iteration of the general approach, now often cited, is that of Allsop P in Caltex 
Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649, 676 [102]. See also Crimmins (1999) 
200 CLR 1, 39 [93] (McHugh J); Graham Barclay Oysters (2002) 211 CLR 540, 596–7 [146], 
[149] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 577–8 [84] (McHugh J); Stuart (2009) 237 CLR 215, 254 
[114] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 261–2 [137]–[138], 266 [149] (Crennan  
and Kiefel JJ). 
 44 This requirement is trite law, but lies at the heart of Sydney Water Corporation v Turano 
(2009) 239 CLR 51, 70 [45] (‘Turano’). 
 45 See, eg, Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520, 550–2, 556–7 
(Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 512, 558–9 
[102]–[103], 573–4 [140] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ); Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 
1, 38–9 [91]–[93], 42 [104] (McHugh J), 61 [166] (Gummow J), 98–100 [277]–[286]  
(Hayne J), 116 [357] (Callinan J); Graham Barclay Oysters (2002) 211 CLR 540, 558–9 [20] 
(Gleeson CJ), 598 [150] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Stuart (2009) 237 CLR 215, 254 [114] 
(Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 261–2 [137]–[138], 266 [149] (Crennan  
and Kiefel JJ). 
 46 Pyrenees (1998) 192 CLR 330, 371 [108] (McHugh J), 389 [168] (Gummow J), 420 [246] 
(Kirby J); Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 1, 13 [3] (Gleeson CJ), 24–5 [43], [46] (Gaudron J), 39 
[93], 41–2 [101]–[102] (McHugh J) (counselling against the use of constructive knowledge in 
this field), 85 [233] (Kirby J); Armidale City Council v Alec Finlayson Pty Ltd (1999) 104 
LGERA 9, 20–1 [27] (actual knowledge); Amaca (2004) 132 LGERA 309, 339 [157]; Port 
Stephens Shire Council v Booth (2005) 148 LGERA 351, 373 [96] (actual knowledge). 
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sense that there is a ‘criterion by which a court can assess’ its propriety;47 (v) 
whether a duty would encroach upon the authority’s ‘core policy-making’ or 
‘(quasi-) legislative functions’;48 (vi) whether a duty would be incompatible 
with the terms, purposes or scope of the statute (in particular, whether the 
statute intended to advance the interests of particular plaintiffs or identifiable 
groups, or those of society ‘as a whole’);49 (vii) whether imposing a duty 
would be likely to distort the impartiality of a body’s decision-making by 
inducing defensive practices,50 or would place decision-makers in a position 
in which their legal or ethical duties might conflict;51 (viii) whether or not it 
 
 47 Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004, 1067 (Lord Diplock); Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 512, 628–9  
[310]–[311] (Hayne J); Graham Barclay Oysters (2002) 211 CLR 540, 554–5 [8], 557 [13]  
(Gleeson CJ); Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 1, 13 [5] (Gleeson CJ); Newcastle City Council v 
Shortland Management Services (2003) 57 NSWLR 173, 189 [80]–[82] (Spigelman CJ); Refrig-
erated Roadways (2009) 77 NSWLR 360, 415 [267], 416 [274], 418–19 [281]–[283]  
(Campbell JA); Electro Optic Systems (2014) 10 ACTLR 1, 47 [201] (Jagot J). 
 48 The ‘core policy-making’ phrase is that of McHugh J in Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 1, 37 [87], 
39 [93]. Other judges restricted their focus to ‘legislative’ or ‘quasi-legislative’ functions:  
at 20–1 [32] (Gaudron J) (‘legislative’), 62 [170] (Gummow J) (‘quasi-legislative’), 100 [288] 
(Kirby J) (‘quasi-legislative’), 101 [291]–[292] (Hayne J) (‘quasi-legislative’). Cf Brodie (2001) 
206 CLR 512, 560 [106] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ): ‘it is no answer to a claim in 
tort against the Commonwealth … that its wrongful acts or omissions were the product of a 
“policy decision”’. It is unclear to what extent there is a distinction between this criterion and 
the previous one. 
 49 Pyrenees (1998) 192 CLR 330, 347 [24]–[25] (Brennan CJ), 391 [175] (Gummow J), 421 [247] 
(Kirby J); Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 1 39–41 [93]–[100] (McHugh J), 72 [203], 76–7  
[213]–[215] (Kirby J); Graham Barclay Oysters (2002) 211 CLR 540, 596–7 [146] (Gummow 
and Hayne JJ); Stuart (2009) 237 CLR 215, 239 [52] (French CJ), 250–1 [98], 254 [112] 
(Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 260 [131]–[132], 263 [141] (Crennan and Kiefel JJ); 
Sutherland Shire Council v Becker [2006] NSWCA 344 (12 December 2006) [100] (Bryson 
JA); Meshlawn [2010] QCA 181 (20 July 2010) [70] (Chesterman J); MM Constructions (Aust) 
Ltd v Port Stephens Council [2012] NSWCA 417 (19 December 2012) [98] (Allsop P) (‘MM 
Constructions’). Note that the relevance of the fact that a statute was intended to benefit the 
public (and not individuals) was previously thought irrelevant to the negligence action by 
both Gibbs CJ and Mason J in Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 436 (Gibbs CJ), 465 (Mason J). 
Note also that the way this question is now framed (is there anything in the statute to negate 
the existence of a duty?) is the reverse of the approach taken by Brennan J in Heyman, who 
saw the essential question as being whether there is anything in the statute that might posi-
tively imply the duty: at 482–3. The former is the proper approach, since the incidence of 
common law negligence liabilities, in contrast to liabilities for breach of statutory duty, does 
not depend on the existence of any positive statutory intention. 
 50 Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 1, 102–3 [296] (Hayne J); Amaca (2004) 132 LGERA 309, 340 
[160] (Ipp JA). Not all judges accept this concern: McKenna v Hunter and New England Local 
Health District [2013] NSWCA 476 (23 December 2013) [105] (Macfarlan JA) (‘McKenna’). 
 51 Sullivan (2001) 207 CLR 562, 582–3 [60]–[63]; X v South Australia [No 2] (2005) 91 SASR 
258, 282 [117] (Anderson J); Precision Products (NSW) Ltd v Hawkesbury City Council (2008) 
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would cohere with other areas of the law;52 (ix) whether or not the authority 
‘assumed responsibility’ to a particular individual who (specifically) relied 
upon it;53 (x) whether or not a duty would posit a risk of an indeterminate54 or 
logically uncontainable55 liability; and (xi) whether or not the plaintiff was 
vulnerable in the sense of reasonably being able to protect himself or herself 
against the harm in question.56 
None of these factors (save foreseeability, which is essential) is now 
thought to be absolutely necessary, or determinative,57 although those relating 
to control, justiciability and the consistency of a duty with statutory purposes 
are regarded as especially important in cases in which it is alleged that an 
authority has been negligent in failing to exercise its statutory powers.58 Some 
 
74 NSWLR 102, 128 [118]–[119] (Allsop P) (‘Precision Products’); Dansar Pty Ltd v Byron 
Shire Council (2014) 89 NSWLR 1, 35 [159] (Meagher JA) (‘Dansar’). 
 52 Sullivan (2001) 207 CLR 562, 581 [54]; X v South Australia [No 3] (2007) 97 SASR 180,  
234–5 [196] (Debelle J); Moorabool Shire Council v Taitapanui (2006) 14 VR 55, 73 [72] 
(Ormiston and Ashley JJA); Precision Products (2008) 74 NSWLR 102, 128 [119] (Allsop P). 
 53 New South Wales v Spearpoint [2009] NSWCA 233 (30 July 2009) [13]–[14] (Ipp JA). General 
reliance of the type contemplated by Mason J (‘dependence’) in Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 
463–4 is no longer regarded as sufficient: see Pyrenees (1998) 192 CLR 330, 344–5 [20] 
(Brennan CJ), 387–8 [163] (Gummow J), [230]–[231] 411 (Kirby J); Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 
512, 627 [307]–[308] (Hayne J); Stuart (2009) 237 CLR 215, 260 [132] (Crennan and  
Kiefel JJ). It now appears that some form of what Brennan J in Heyman called ‘induced’ 
reliance is required: at 486. This has strangely not prevented some judges continuing to refer 
to it as one possible factor: see, eg, Makawe Pty Ltd v Randwick City Council (2009) 171 
LGERA 165, 175 [26] (Hodgson JA) (‘Makawe’). 
 54 Makawe (2009) 171 LGERA 165, 186 [93] (Hodgson JA); Electro Optic Systems (2014) 10 
ACTLR 1, 84 [353] (Jagot J), 195 [733] (Katzmann J). See also the references to the different 
concept of ‘massive’ liabilities in Graham Barclay Oysters (2002) 211 CLR 540, 665 [324] 
(Callinan J); Amaca (2004) 132 LGERA 309, 339 [157] (Ipp JA). 
 55 See especially Stuart, where Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ held that if a duty applied to 
exercise of powers under mental health legislation, it would logically have to apply to the 
exercise of any type of power: (2009) 237 CLR 215, 252–3 [107]. 
 56 Pyrenees (1998) 192 CLR 30, 370 [107] (McHugh J), 421 [247] (Kirby J); Makawe (2009) 171 
LGERA 165, 173 [21] (Hodgson JA), 181 [63] (Campbell JA), 196–8 [168]–[178] (Simpson J); 
Amaca (2004) 132 LGERA 309, 339 [156] (Ipp JA). 
 57 Makawe (2009) 171 LGERA 165, 179–80 [48] (Hodgson JA) (considering the features’ 
‘cumulative effect’); Dansar (2014) 89 NSWLR 1, 24 [109] (Meagher JA). 
 58 Few claims in recent years have expressly been rejected on grounds of their constitutional (as 
opposed to practical) non-justiciability, but several have failed for lack of proof that an au-
thority’s powers gave it sufficient control over the risk in question: see, eg, Graham Barclay 
Oysters (2002) 211 CLR 540, 589 [122] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 630 [248] (Kirby J); Stuart 
(2009) 237 CLR 215, 254 [114] (Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ); X v South Australia [No 2] 
(2005) 91 SASR 258, 282; New South Wales v Godfrey (2004) Aust Torts Reports ¶81–741; 
Turano (2009) 239 CLR 51, 73 [53]. 
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cases involving pure economic loss have also foundered on the basis that a 
plaintiff had a reasonable means of protecting itself against the economic risk 
in question,59 which is consistent with the approach taken in respect of other, 
private defendants. 
Beyond this, decisions regarding failings of a more ‘operational’ nature 
often turn on lower-level questions of breach, with significant leniency being 
accorded to authorities so as to take account of their varied responsibilities, 
the financial and other resources available to them,60 and their legitimate 
expectations that individuals will protect themselves against more ‘obvious’ 
forms of hazard, such as the dangers of diving into potentially shallow waters, 
or walking upon uneven ground.61 The fact that courts are able to accommo-
date concerns about their capacity to judge public decisions by taking a more 
hands-off approach toward questions of breach was signalled many years ago 
in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman itself, in which both Gibbs CJ and 
Wilson J opined that even if a duty were owed by the Council on the facts, it 
could not be shown to have been breached.62 The same view has been taken in 
other cases in more recent years.63 
The common law approach to public body negligence liability described 
above clearly has both positive and negative features. On the downside, there 
was (and still is) a degree of uncertainty in both UK and Australian law as to 
exactly when a discretionary public decision of the type forming the focus of 
the Ipp Review will be actionable. The trend has been away from hard and fast 
refusals to investigate such questions on constitutional grounds (save perhaps 
in the most exceptional and obvious cases) toward a more flexible approach 
based on practical judicial capacities to address such issues and respect for 
express or implied Parliamentary intentions. The soft edges of the criteria 
deployed in these inquiries, when combined with the elasticity of the modern 
multifactorial approach toward duty of care questions in Australia, create 
 
 59 See, eg, MM Constructions (2012) 191 LGERA 292. 
 60 See, eg, Refrigerated Roadways (2009) 77 NSWLR 360. 
 61 Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431, 454–5 [52] (Toohey and 
Gummow JJ); Vairy v Wyong Shire Council (2005) 223 CLR 422, 481–3 [215]–[220] (Callinan 
and Heydon JJ); Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 512, 581 [163] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 
 62 (1985) 157 CLR 424, 448–9 (Gibbs CJ), 471 (Wilson J). For the view that such discretion 
inevitably makes it harder to prove breach see also Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 12, 601 [229] 
(Kirby J), 559–60 [104]–[105] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), citing Miller v McKeon 
(1905) 3 CLR 50, 60 (Griffith CJ). 
 63 See, eg, Meshlawn [2010] QCA 181 (20 July 2010), where a discretionary decision about 
liquor licencing was adjudged perfectly reasonable, when a realistic view was taken of all the 
evidence. 
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concern about the predictability of public bodies’ private law liabilities. 
Outside existing precedents, the approach of Australian courts toward duty 
questions now has the semblance of a structured discretion, rather than a set 
of hard and fast rules. The judicial tendency to consider more issues at the 
breach stage also means that more extensive, detailed evidence — sometimes 
of a sensitive, financial type — is likely to have to be presented by authorities 
at trial; a concern that governments voiced openly in the wake of the High 
Court of Australia’s decision in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (‘Brodie’).64 
This could mean longer litigation, more detailed fact-finding and  
more reference by courts to expert assessments of public decisions about 
sensitive, difficult questions. 
On the other hand, it is quite clear that the common law system is alert to 
the various concerns about imposing negligence liability on a public body in 
respect of its unique statutory functions. It has developed a sophisticated set 
of tools for reaching nuanced decisions that reflect a balance of justice and 
policy considerations. The common law has also shown itself to be quite 
resolute in rejecting claims that question a public body’s legislative65 or quasi-
legislative66 decisions, and in recent years has robustly denied liability in a 
series of claims involving discretionary public decisions.67 It is true that the 
Presland v Hunter Area Health Service (‘Presland’)68 case, to which we allude 
further below, created some controversy in Australia in the early part of the 
millennium and a sense that perhaps the law had gone too far, but,  
if that decision was ever wrong, the courts themselves were swift to deal with 
the error on appeal.69 
A final benefit of the common law system — which is important (and not a 
little ironic) in light of the aspirations for consistency that underpinned the 
Ipp Review — is that it provides a unitary normative system: the law, as stated 
by the High Court of Australia, binds courts in all domestic jurisdictions. 
Although the system hence carries with it some frustratingly unpredictable 
 
 64 (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
 65 See, eg, Graham Barclay Oysters (2012) 211 CLR 540, where no claim was held possible 
against the New South Wales Government for failure to legislate, so as to more closely control 
the operations of the oyster industry. 
 66 See, eg, Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 1, where no claim was held possible in respect of the 
defendant’s failure to make regulations to improve worker safety. 
 67 See, eg, X v Bedfordshire [1995] 2 AC 633; Sullivan (2001) 207 CLR 562; Stuart (2009) 327 
CLR 215. 
 68 [2003] NSWSC 754 (19 August 2003). For the facts and decision, see below Part IV(B)(3). 
 69 Hunter Area Health Service v Presland (2005) 63 NSWLR 22. 
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features, it at least offers the possibility of forcing Australian law, however 
gradually, to a single, final consensus position. This, we suggest, accords a 
respectful equality of legal treatment to citizens in respect of their basic 
private interests that is woefully lacking in the random pattern of current 
statutory arrangements. 
III   T H E  I PP  RE V I E W  P R O P O S A L  
This is the background against which the Ipp Review Panel was asked to 
determine how public authority negligence liability should be treated in 2002. 
Despite the common law’s various control devices, a number of local govern-
ments expressed genuine concern to the Panel about their potential liability, 
particularly for decisions affected by scarce resources, or embodying choices 
between competing activities or social priorities. They argued that this threat 
of liability was affecting their ability to perform their functions in the  
public interest.70 
The Panel identified two potentially problematic types of case: those in-
volving public decisions about the allocation of limited resources; and those 
involving decisions about matters of social policy. Its solution was to allow 
authorities to meet claims by pleading that any alleged negligence ‘was the 
result of a conscious and considered decision, made in good faith, on the basis 
of financial, economic, political or social considerations’.71 The resulting 
‘policy defence’ was proposed in the following terms: 
In any claim for damages for personal injury or death arising out of negligent 
performance or non-performance of a public function, a policy decision (that 
is, a decision based substantially on financial, economic, political or social fac-
tors or constraints) cannot be used to support a finding that the defendant was 
negligent unless it was so unreasonable that no reasonable public functionary 
in the defendant’s position could have made it.72 
In framing the defence in this way, the Panel’s intention was not to make 
‘policy decisions’ completely immune to tort liability (‘non-justiciable’, in the 
 
 70 Ipp Review, above n 1, 151 [10.3]. The paradigms for these examples were the cases of Brodie 
(2001) 206 CLR 512 and Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004 respectively. Note, however, the actual 
decision in the latter case did not turn on an attack on any policy decision of the Home Office 
to operate a system of low security prisons. 
 71 Ipp Review, above n 1, 154 [10.13]. 
 72 Ibid 158 [10.27] (recommendation 39). 
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language of the common law), nor indeed to provide a true ‘defence’,73 but 
instead to subject negligence liability in such cases to an additional precondi-
tion, by lowering the standard of care required and thereby raising the hurdle 
plaintiffs must overcome to establish liability. 
One irony of this proposal is that, taken at face value, it endorsed a poten-
tially more extensive approach to public body liability in respect of social 
policy and resource allocation decisions than arguably existed at common law 
at the time. This is because, with the occasional exception,74 it had not been 
suggested that decisions of the ‘policy’ type would either be justiciable by 
courts, or provably negligent on the normal common law standard in any 
event. Since the mandate of the Panel was to cut back on public authority 
liabilities, it must, we suppose, have assumed that liability for such decisions 
still remained a serious possibility at common law.75 Perhaps the common 
law’s approach was adjudged simply too unclear at the time for the contrary 
conclusion to be considered safe. In fact, however, we have been unable to 
find a single case, English or Australian, either prior or subsequent to the Ipp 
Review, in which a court has held the type of social policy or higher-level 
resourcing decision that was the focus of the Panel’s concerns to be both 
justiciable and to give rise to negligence liability. In our view, this seriously 
 
 73 The mere fact that the onus lies on a defendant to raise or plead a matter is probably 
insufficient to classify the matter as one of ‘defence’, although some authors do use the term in 
this way: see James Goudkamp, Tort Law Defences (Hart Publishing, 2013) 6. It is also unclear 
which onus — evidential or legal — was intended to be cast onto the defendant. For the view 
that the onus (legal or evidential unspecified) lies on the defendant to establish that the 
relevant decision was based on the exercise of a special statutory power, but that the ultimate 
onus of proving that a decision breached the lower standard of care still lies on the plaintiff: 
see Curtis v Harden Shire Council (2014) 88 NSWLR 10, 14 [7] (Bathurst CJ), 64 [244] 
(Basten JA) (‘Curtis’). Cf Dansar (2014) 89 NSWLR 1, 21 [93] (Macfarlan JA). 
 74 See, eg, Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004, 1068 (Lord Diplock); Smith v Secretary of State for 
Health (2002) 67 BMLR 34 [95] (Morland J), both of which suggest in obiter that an ultra 
vires policy decision might be justiciable. But subsequent cases have clarified that the fact that 
a decision is ultra vires does not necessarily make it justiciable: see especially Barrett [2001] 2 
AC 550; Phelps [2001] 2 AC 619. The recent emphasis on the fact that the ‘policy/operation’ 
distinction is only a guide to justiciability, and not definitive, might also give rise to this 
impression that policy decisions are justiciable: see Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 512, 560 [106] 
(Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). But the more credible interpretation of these state-
ments is probably that the fact that some operation is involved does not necessarily make a 
decision justiciable, because operation can itself depend on higher-level resourcing decisions. 
That does not necessarily make truly political decisions justiciable, even if they are ultra vires: 
see Booth and Squires, above n 11, 54–8. 
 75 A contrary thesis — that the Panel actually intended to extend liability — was mooted at one 
point by Vines, above n 29, 463. However, this seems very hard to reconcile with the Panel’s 
terms of reference. 
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calls into question whether or not any additional protection for public 
authorities was really needed in the domain in which the Ipp Review sought to 
provide it. If this is so, then the Ipp Review was complicit in setting up a straw 
man, and subsequent legislation has sought to solve a problem that never 
really existed. 
The defence as formulated involved several elements: the performance of a 
public function; a policy decision; a claim arising out of negligence; and a 
resulting personal injury, or death.76 These elements are worthy of further 
amplification because they assist in identifying the proposal’s purpose and 
intended scope, and in highlighting the extent to which the enacted provi-
sions we examine in Part IV vary from the suggested design. 
A  ‘Public Function’ 
The defence was intended to protect only those actions or omissions of a 
public authority that involve the performance of a ‘public function’. Whilst 
this term went undefined and was left for future judicial interpretation,77 the 
Panel did broadly characterise a public function as one that requires a 
defendant to ‘balance the interests of individuals against a wider public 
interest, or to take account of competing demands on its resources’.78 There-
fore, the defence was not intended to protect authorities in the performance 
of activities that might also be engaged in by private individuals or corpora-
tions. In this regard, it replicated the common law’s existing practice of 
providing no special protection for the private activities of public bodies, such 
as owning or occupying property.79 
B  ‘Policy Decision’ 
The defence was clearly expressed to apply only to ‘policy decision[s]’, defined 
as a ‘decision based substantially on financial, economic, political or social 
factors or constraints’.80 This aligns with the common law view of the types of 
case in respect of which there is traditionally some constitutional justiciability 
 
 76 Ipp Review, above n 1, 158 [10.27] (recommendation 39). 
 77 Ibid 156 [10.23]. 
 78 Ibid 156 [10.22]. 
 79 The difficulty of defining public or private ‘actions’ and ‘functions’ is insightfully and fully 
discussed by Aronson, above n 24, 76–7. It lies beyond the scope of the current piece. 
 80 Ipp Review, above n 1, 158 [10.27] (recommendation 39). 
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problem, or some practical difficulty in determining the proper standard of 
care for a court to apply. 
The term ‘policy decision’ itself has two sub-elements. First, there must be 
a ‘decision’, which is to say that the public authority must have actually made a 
conscious choice in respect of a matter, not simply failed to turn its mind to 
the question of whether or not to perform a public function.81 
Second, the decision must be one of ‘policy’, as opposed to an operational 
one. This distinction, as discussed in Part II, is now regarded as providing no 
more than a rough guide to justiciability at common law, but the Panel 
implicitly appears to have regarded it as serviceable, if properly explained. The 
Ipp Review gave an example of its application in a case involving road 
maintenance. If a car accident were caused by a pothole in a road and the 
authority led evidence that: (i) it did not know about the hole; (ii) it inspected 
roads on a six-monthly cycle; (iii) the hole developed after the last inspection; 
and (iv) it had formally resolved not to carry out inspections more frequently 
for budgetary reasons, this would most likely be a policy decision and the 
defence could be raised. However, if the defendant knew about the pothole, 
but then simply decided to do nothing, or inspected the hole and wrongly 
decided it was not dangerous, the decision would probably not be based on 
financial, economic, political or social factors, and the proposed defence 
would be inapplicable.82 
C  ‘Personal Injury or Death’ 
The proposed defence was limited to cases involving ‘personal injury or 
death’, and did not extend to cases of property damage or economic loss. This 
reflected the Panel’s limited terms of reference.83 The restriction is significant 
precisely because all jurisdictions that subsequently enacted a similar defence 
appear to have ignored it, as will be discussed in Part IV. 
D  ‘Negligent Performance’ 
The defence was expressly intended to apply to negligence claims, but the 
Panel also recommended its extension to claims for breach of statutory  
 
 81 Ibid 158 [10.28]. 
 82 Ibid 158–9 [10.31]–[10.33]. The Panel was only instructed to consider claims of this type. 
 83 Ibid 158 [10.28]. 
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duty.84 Although the latter of these causes of action has been described as 
having ‘almost no life in this country beyond its original context of workplace 
injuries’,85 the concern was evidently that plaintiffs might sidestep the 
proposed limitation on negligence liability by relying on breach of statutory 
duty instead,86 thereby subverting the objectives of the reform. The logic of 
this part of the proposal also seems to have been lost on most jurisdictions 
implementing it, since in most of the these jurisdictions, the relevant provi-
sions probably apply only to claims based on breach of statutory duty, which is 
puzzling for reasons articulated further in Part IV. 
E  ‘So Unreasonable that No Reasonable Public Functionary in the  
Defendant’s Position Could Have Made It’ 
The substance of the proposal was for the application of a much-reduced 
standard of care to policy decisions, based on the Wednesbury unreasonable-
ness test that prevails in judicial review cases.87 According to Lord Greene in 
the Wednesbury case itself, it requires the relevant failure to be of a very high 
order of magnitude — ‘something overwhelming’.88 
The Wednesbury standard is a public law standard, but had been set to 
work in the negligence context in the UK in Stovin v Wise (‘Stovin’), where 
Lord Hoffmann determined that a council could not be liable for carelessly 
failing to exercise its statutory powers to improve visibility at a road junction 
unless it had ‘a duty in public law to undertake the work … [so that] it would 
have been irrational not to exercise its discretion to do so.’89 
The proposed defence was expressly stated as implementing the approach 
taken in Stovin in Australian law,90 but the formulation has proven controver-
sial for several reasons. First, Professor Aronson has astutely observed that it 
is wrong to regard the defence as a literal implementation of Stovin.91 This is 
because Stovin made irrationality an absolute precondition of a public body’s 
liability for omission to exercise a statutory power; it did not suggest it as an 
 
 84 Ibid 162 [10.45]. 
 85 Aronson, above n 24, 76. 
 86 Ipp Review, above n 1, 162 [10.44]. 
 87 Ibid 157 [10.27]. 
 88 [1948] 1 KB 223, 230. 
 89 [1996] AC 923, 956 (emphasis added), cited in Ipp Review, above n 1, 157 [10.26]. See also X 
v Bedfordshire [1995] 2 AC 633, 736–7 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
 90 Ipp Review, above n 1, 157 [10.26]. 
 91 Aronson, above n 24, 47–8. 
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appropriate test of whether or not the body has breached a duty proven to be 
owed. Secondly, as the previous section made clear, the House of Lords has 
since retreated from using the Wednesbury unreasonableness standard in tort 
law. Indeed, Lord Hoffman has himself indicated that any suggestion he may 
have made in Stovin that breaching the public law standard could found a 
private law right of action in tort, was ‘controversial’, and probably ‘ill-
advised’.92 The public law concept of ‘irrationality’ has also been vehemently 
criticised academically93 and in recent Australian decisions interpreting 
statutory enactments of the policy defence, many of which point out the 
entirely distinct function that the concept plays in the review of public law 
decisions.94 
Finally, the Wednesbury unreasonableness test is notoriously difficult to 
apply. Although its adoption was intended to signal a lower standard of care,95 
it is still difficult to articulate precisely what conduct it protects. The signifi-
cant body of case law considering the test in its original, administrative law 
context has resulted in its description as tautologous, circular and vague.96 
Some commentators have credibly ventured to suggest that this vagueness is 
in turn likely to soften any practical distinction between it and the usual 
approach to breach in negligence law.97 To the extent that Australian jurisdic-
 
 92 Gorringe [2004] 1 WLR 1057, 1065–6 [26]. On the more general retreat see Booth and 
Squires, above n 11, 49–58. 
 93 See, eg, Jane Convery, ‘Public or Private? Duty of Care in a Statutory Framework: Stovin v 
Wise in the House of Lords’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 559, 565–7; Anthony Mason, 
‘Negligence and the Liability of Public Authorities’ (1998) 2(1) Edinburgh Law Review 3, 18; 
 S H Bailey and M J Bowman, ‘Public Authority Negligence Revisited’ (2000) 59 Cambridge 
Law Journal 85, 112–17; Elizabeth Carroll, ‘Wednesbury Unreasonableness as a Limit on the 
Civil Liability of Public Authorities’ (2007) 15 Tort Law Review 77; Grant Scott Watson, 
‘Section 43A of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW): Public Law Styled Immunity for the 
Negligence of Public and other Authorities?’ (2007) 15 Torts Law Journal 153, 177; Donal 
Nolan, ‘Varying the Standard of Care in Negligence’ (2013) 72 Cambridge Law Journal 651, 
669. 
 94 See, eg, Allianz Australia Insurance Ltd v Road Traffic Authority (NSW) (2010) 57 MVR 80, 97 
[78] (‘Allianz’). 
 95 Ipp Review, above n 1, 157 [10.27]. 
 96 Allianz (2010) 57 MVR 80, 97–8 [79], citing Fares Rural Meat & Livestock Co Pty Ltd v 
Australian Meat & Life-Stock Corporation (1990) 96 ALR 153; Margaret Allars, Introduction to 
Australian Administrative Law (Butterworths, 1990) 187 [5.52]; Geoff Airo-Farulla, ‘Rational-
ity and Judicial Review of Administrative Action’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 
543. 
 97 Cane, above n 11, 208; Bailey and Bowman, above n 93, 114. For evidence of such confusion, 
see below Part IV(B)(4) for the dissenting judgment of Pullin JA in Southern Properties (WA) 
Pty Ltd v Executive Director of the Department of Conservation and Land Management (2012) 
42 WAR 287 (‘Southern Properties Appeal’). 
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tions have sought to interpret and implement the new standard in negligence 
cases, it has certainly proven problematic, as the next Part demonstrates. 
These difficulties are likely, we suggest, to undermine the idea that the reforms 
have brought any greater certainty about the extent of public body negligence 
liability, even if their effect has been to further limit it. 
IV  T H E  STAT U T O RY  R E F O R M S  
Following the Ipp Review, all Australian jurisdictions, with the exceptions of 
South Australia and the Northern Territory, introduced or amended legisla-
tion with the stated intention of giving effect to its recommendations. The 
legislation is remarkable for its lack of consistency either cross-
jurisdictionally, or with the design of the Panel’s original proposal. This 
deviation from the original approach would perhaps be less of a concern if the 
majority of the provisions were not expressed to be based upon it. 
A  Three Forms of Provision, Not One 
The legislative amendments consisted, in the end, of three main types of 
provision, not one.98 These took the form of: 
1 a general principles provision; 
2 a version of the Ipp Review policy defence; and 
3 a specific provision limiting the liability of road authorities. 
Neither the first nor the third of these was ever suggested by the Panel and we 
reference them here merely to contextualise the various ‘policy defences’ that 
came about. The aim of provisions of the third type was partially to restore the 
old, heavily criticised ‘non-feasance rule’ in respect of road authority liability 
for dangerous road defects,99 which runs directly contrary to the Panel’s view 
that the High Court of Australia’s decision in Brodie was sound in principle.100 
Their practical effect is to relieve road authorities of the burden of presenting 
 
 98 For an overview of the full range, see Barker et al, above n 27, 595–8. In New South Wales, 
there is hence one type of provision that precludes liability for failure to exercise a regulatory 
function unless a plaintiff could have forced the exercise of those functions in (public law) 
proceedings: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 44. 
 99 See Gleeson CJ’s commentary in Brodie (2001) 206 CLR 512, 527–9 [14]–[18]. 
 100 Ipp Review, above n 1, 152 [10.5]. Whilst recognising the concerns to which the decision gave 
rise, the Panel suggested these could and should be met instead by the policy defence. 
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evidence to defend allegations of breach in cases where it is alleged that they 
ought to have discovered a risk of which they were unaware. The provisions 
are not directly related to combatting any of the difficulties alluded to above 
regarding discretionary ‘policy’ decisions, being equally applicable to care-
lessness of an entirely ‘operational’ nature, and they obviously only apply to a 
very limited range of public authorities. 
Provisions of the first, general type appear in all post-Ipp Review legislative 
enactments, and apply to all kinds of public authorities. Except in Victoria, 
these provisions stipulate that, in determining questions of either  
duty or breach: 
 (a) the functions required to be exercised by the authority are limited by 
the financial and other resources that are reasonably available to the au-
thority for the purpose of exercising the functions; 
 (b) the general allocation of financial or other resources by the authority is 
not open to challenge; 
 (c) the functions required to be exercised by the authority are to be decided 
by reference to the broad range of its activities (and not merely by refer-
ence to the matter to which the proceeding relates); and 
 (d) the authority may rely on evidence of its compliance with its general 
procedures and any applicable standards for the exercise of its functions 
as evidence of the proper exercise of its functions in the matter to which 
the proceeding relates.101 
The Victorian provision incorporates (a), (c) and (d), but omits (b).102 
It is unclear whether any of these rules significantly extends the protection 
previously available to public authorities at common law, but it seems 
unlikely.103 One key problem for current purposes, however, is how principle 
(b) interacts with the policy defence provisions that we examine in the next 
 
 101 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Qld) s 35; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 38; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 
2002 (ACT) s 110; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5W. 
 102 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 83. 
 103 Proposition (a) may mark the most significant shift in extending the same economically 
subjective standard of care to public authorities generally as prevails at common law to land-
owners tackling natural hazards arising on their land: see Goldman v Hargrave [1967] AC 
645. But there is arguably already Australian authority for it at common law: Cekan v Haines 
(1990) 21 NSWLR 296, 314 (Mahoney J); Refrigerated Roadways (2009) 77 NSWLR 360. See 
also Crimmins (1999) 200 CLR 1, 21 [34] (Gaudron J). Proposition (d) is radical if it allows 
authorities to use their own negligent procedures to immunise themselves against liability, 
but it has been doubted whether the provision has this effect: Transpacific Cleanaway Ltd v 
South East Water Ltd [2008] VCAT 1798 (29 August 2008) [71] (Macnamara DP) (‘Transpa-
cific Cleanaway’). 
24 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 40:1 
section, since decisions about general allocations of resources appear para-
digmatic of the type of ‘policy decision’ that the Ipp Review’s ‘policy defence’ 
proposal was intended to protect. Where jurisdictions (such as New South 
Wales) have enacted both principle (b) (that the general allocation of financial 
… resources is not open to challenge) and a ‘policy defence’ of the type 
examined in the next Part, the legislation now appears to drive a wedge 
between certain types of policy decision that are completely immune to 
negligence liability (‘general’ resource allocations that are ‘not open to 
challenge’),104 and other types of policy decision (decisions about more 
‘specific’ resource allocation taken in the ‘exercise of special statutory powers’) 
which remain potentially actionable, provided they are so unreasonable that 
no reasonable authority could have made them.105 This is a puzzle. If the 
distinction is indeed intended and extant in the legislation, its rationale is 
unclear and its boundaries hard to delineate.106 The only way of avoiding the 
conclusion that different legal approaches are intended in respect of different 
levels of ‘policy decision’ in the same legislation, would be to construe ‘policy 
defence’ provisions of the second type as, somewhat paradoxically, not aimed 
at policy resourcing decisions at all, but at failings of a purely ‘operational’ 
type. Although there is clear evidence that these provisions do apply to 
operational failings, as we shall see, it is highly unlikely that they are confined 
to failings of that type. The result is an uncomfortable interpretive deadlock, 
the proper escape from which is yet to be determined. 
B  The ‘Policy Defences’ 
Almost all jurisdictions that implemented statutory reforms post-Ipp Review 
included some version of the policy defence proposed, but there are signifi-
cant variations in the terminology used. This has resulted in inconsistencies 
across jurisdictions and significant departures from the core elements of the 
Ipp Review’s recommendation. None of the legislative policy defences are 
confined to proceedings involving actions for personal injury or death;107 
 
 104 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 42. 
 105 Ibid s 43A. 
 106 For examples of the struggle, see especially Refrigerated Roadways (2009) 77 NSWLR 360, 
440–1 [405]. See also New South Wales v Ball (2007) 69 NSWLR 463. 
 107 In Queensland, the provisions apply to claims for personal injury, property damage and 
economic loss: Civil Liability Act 2002 (Qld) sch 2. In Tasmania, they apply to claims for 
personal injury, death, or property damage: Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas). In the Australian 
Capital Territory and New South Wales, they apply to civil liability in tort: Civil Law (Wrongs) 
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some of them appear to have been interpreted as applying to failures in 
operation, as well as in matters of ‘policy’, and several apply exclusively to 
actions for breach of statutory duty, leaving negligence liabilities either 
entirely untouched, or touched only by the other types of provision we  
have mentioned. 
1 Queensland, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory 
The Queensland, Tasmanian and Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’) 
provisions are broadly similar, and collectively represent the greatest depar-
ture from the Ipp Review’s recommendations. We consider them together. 
Section 36 of Queensland’s Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) is entitled ‘pro-
ceedings against public or other authorities based on breach of statutory duty’. 
It provides: 
 (1) This section applies to a proceeding that is based on an alleged wrongful 
exercise of or failure to exercise a function of a public or other authority. 
 (2) For the purposes of the proceeding, an act or omission of the authority does 
not constitute a wrongful exercise or failure unless the act or omission was in 
the circumstances so unreasonable that no public or other authority having the 
functions of the authority in question could properly consider the act or omis-
sion to be a reasonable exercise of its functions. 
The Tasmanian and ACT provisions are almost identical, although both also 
specifically refer to breach of statutory duty in the text of the  
provision itself.108 
The specified standard of care (‘so unreasonable’) mimics the Ipp Review 
recommendation, but there are few other similarities. Protection is not 
explicitly confined to an authority’s performance of its public functions,109 to 
policy decisions, or to claims for personal injury or death. The generic 
reference to protection for the exercise of any function may therefore give the 
 
Act 2002 (ACT) s 108; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 40. In Western Australia, they apply to 
personal injury, property damage or economic loss: Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) ss 5V, 3. 
Victoria also defines harm to include property damage: Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 43. 
 108 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 40(1) states that ‘this section applies to proceedings in respect 
of a claim to which this Part applies that are based on an alleged breach of a statutory duty by 
a public or other authority’. Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 111(1) states that ‘this 
section applies to a proceeding based on a claimed breach of a statutory duty by a public or 
other authority (the defendant authority) in relation to the exercise of, or a failure to exercise, 
a function of the defendant authority’. 
 109 Meaning functions that derive exclusively from an authority’s statutory powers, rather than 
from activities that private parties also perform: Ipp Review, above n 1, 156 [10.22]. 
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provisions a range of applications, which is far wider than that contemplated 
by the Ipp Review, and which is hard to justify on a Diceyan view.110 Where a 
public body acts in a private capacity (for example, drives a car, or builds a 
flight of stairs on its property) there seems little justification for treating it any 
differently in terms of the standard of care it is expected to observe. 
On the other hand, the express reference in these provisions to ‘breach of 
statutory duty’111 clearly has the potential to curtail their scope considerably. 
Whilst the Ipp Review Panel intended the defence to apply to actions for 
breach of statutory duty in addition to actions in negligence, so as to prevent 
plaintiffs undercutting the aims of the reform, the provision, as drafted, seems 
to apply exclusively to the former. 
This is a strange result. Professor Aronson concludes that it is the effect of 
the legislation as enacted, but rightly notes the oddity of limiting a measure 
designed to significantly curb public authority liability to an action that has so 
little life outside the workplace injury context.112 The application of a lower 
standard of care in actions for breach of statutory duty also seems out of kilter 
with the fundamentals of the action itself, which does not necessarily depend 
on proof of any lack of care. 
Unfortunately, the extrinsic material surrounding the introduction of the 
legislation offers little by way of clarification. The Explanatory Notes and 
second reading speech to the Queensland Bill make no mention of the type of 
claims to which the provision will apply.113 The Notes accompanying the 
Tasmanian Bill and the subsequent second reading speech are more narrowly 
 
 110 See above n 10. 
 111 As evident in the title of s 36 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), and in the text of the 
provisions in Tasmania and the ACT: Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 40(1); Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 111(1). 
 112 Aronson, above n 24, 76. 
 113 Explanatory Notes, Civil Liability Bill 2003 (Qld) 12; Queensland, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Assembly, 11 March 2003, 366–9 (Rod Welford, Attorney-General and Minister 
for Justice). The Explanatory Notes speak only to interpretation of the reasonableness stand-
ard, stating that: 
clause 36 provides that the mere fact that a public or other authority undertakes a certain 
activity under a statutory power, or does not undertake a certain activity despite holding 
a statutory power to do so, of itself does not mean the authority must act in the same way 
in each circumstance. However, if the actions of the public authority are manifestly un-
reasonable in the circumstances, those actions may constitute a wrongful act or a failure 
to act. The standard by which the actions of the public authority are to be considered is 
that of a reasonable public authority. 
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worded, referring to breach of statutory duty,114 but do not expressly disclaim 
any application to negligence claims. 
This confusion was recently addressed in Hamcor Pty Ltd v Queensland 
(‘Hamcor’),115 a case in which the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service 
(‘QFRS’) unwisely applied water to a chemical fire at the plaintiff ’s premises, 
resulting in serious contamination of the plaintiff ’s land. QFRS raised the 
Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 36 defence to the plaintiff ’s claim in negli-
gence. At first instance, QFRS was found to have owed and breached a duty of 
care at common law,116 but the claim was dismissed on the basis that it was 
entitled to benefit from an immunity particular to fire brigades.117 Dalton J 
nonetheless expressed the obiter view that s 36 does not apply to negligence 
claims, reaching this conclusion by reading the section in the context of the 
Act as a whole, by applying the presumption that statutes do not derogate 
from private rights, and by noting the section’s explicit (and in her Honour’s 
view, deliberate) reference to ‘breach of statutory duty’.118 On appeal,  
Dalton J’s decision was upheld, but the Queensland Court of Appeal was not 
called upon to decide the s 36 point and declined the invitation to do so,119 
which leaves us without any conclusive steer. 
As regards the substance and effect of s 36, Dalton J acknowledged that the 
provision ‘drastically reduces the rights of persons to a remedy by very 
significantly lowering the standard of care owed by public or other authori-
ties’120 within the traditional statutory duty, breach, damage and causation 
framework.121 Her Honour also suggested that, whilst the public law test of 
Wednesbury unreasonableness is out of place in civil proceedings and in this 
respect ‘fraught with difficulty’,122 the section nonetheless gives effect to it, 
requiring ‘the kind of unreasonableness which invalidates, or makes improp-
er, the act or omission as an exercise of statutory power’.123 This standard, her 
 
 114 Explanatory Notes, Civil Liability Amendment Bill 2003 (Tas); Tasmania, Parliamentary 
Debates, House of Assembly, 24 June 2003, 82–97 (Judy Jackson). 
 115 [2014] QSC 224 (1 October 2014). 
 116 Ibid [174], [182] (Dalton J). 
 117 Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 (Qld) s 129. 
 118 Hamcor [2014] QSC 224 (1 October 2014) [195]. 
 119 Hamcor Pty Ltd v Queensland [2015] QCA 183 (2 October 2015) [64]–[67]. 
 120 Hamcor [2014] QSC 224 (1 October 2014) [196]. 
 121 Ibid [201]. 
 122 Ibid [205]. 
 123 Ibid [210]. 
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Honour thought, ‘goes beyond a Bolam standard’124 and makes it ‘extraordi-
narily difficult for a plaintiff to prove breach’.125 Had the section applied, her 
Honour would therefore have concluded that QFRS’s actions were insufficient 
to violate it;126 a conclusion that the Court of Appeal did choose to endorse.127 
Also implicit in Dalton J’s judgment is recognition of the fact that the 
provision potentially applies to claims for economic loss; and to purely 
operational decisions about how to set about extinguishing a fire, which is 
clearly not something that the Ipp Review Panel intended, or which any  
judge, law reform body, or member of the academy has, to our knowledge, 
ever recommended. 
2 Victoria 
The Victorian provision is similar, but is potentially narrower in scope  
insofar as it applies to acts or omissions ‘relating to a function conferred on 
the public authority specifically in its capacity as a public authority’.128 This 
captures the additional, ‘public function’ element of the Ipp Review’s defence 
that is arguably lacking from the text of the Queensland, ACT and Tasmanian 
provisions. The Victorian legislation also expressly excludes negligence claims 
from its reach,129 and contains a specific reference in the text of the provision 
itself to breach of statutory duty.130 Unsurprisingly, given this language, the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal and the Supreme Court of 
Victoria have confirmed its application to only claims of the latter type.131 A 
further distinguishing feature of the provision is that it does not apply to the 
breach of ‘absolute’ statutory duties. This is superficially more logical than the 
 
 124 Ibid [204]. 
 125 Ibid [210]. 
 126 Ibid [211]. 
 127 Hamcor Pty Ltd v Queensland [2015] QCA 183 (2 October 2015) [61] (albeit for the purpose 
of deciding the proper application of the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 (Qld) s 129). 
 128 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 84(2). 
 129 The Act makes it clear that s 84 does not apply to negligence claims, stating ‘this part (except 
section 84) applies to any claim for damages resulting from negligence’: ibid s 80(1). 
 130 Ibid s 84(1). 
 131 Transpacific Cleanaway [2008] VCAT 1798 (29 August 2008) [77] (Macnamara DP); South 
East Water Ltd v Transpacific Cleanaway Pty Ltd (2010) 177 LGERA 1, 34 [62]–[63]  
(Cavanough J); Quigley v Lower Murray Urban and Rural Water Corporation [2014] VCAT 
1325 (21 October 2014) [21] (Macnamara VP); Sami v Roads Corporation (2008) 51 MVR 
118, 150 [128] (Vickery J). 
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Queensland, ACT and Tasmanian provisions, but likely to further limit its 
practical scope to a very narrow range of cases.132 
The probable confinement of the policy defence in Queensland, Tasmania, 
the ACT and Victoria to claims for breach of statutory duty has therefore 
rendered the provisions of little practical use to public authorities, given the 
rarity of such actions succeeding outside of the health and safety context. 
Given the serious repercussions that the provisions of the first three of these 
jurisdictions in particular could have on plaintiff rights in respect of even 
operational failings in negligence law, we would not consider this confine-
ment to be a matter of regret. 
3 New South Wales 
The New South Wales legislation contains two separate provisions applying 
the Wednesbury standard to public authorities. Section 43 of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW) is drafted in almost identical terms to Tasmania’s provision, 
and applies solely to claims for breach of statutory duty.133 
By contrast, s 43A offers a more wide-ranging defence in all proceedings 
‘based on’ the ‘exercise of special statutory powers’.134 A special statutory 
power is defined as one conferred under statute, and of a kind that persons 
generally cannot exercise without specific statutory authority.135 The exercise 
(or non-exercise) of such powers does not attract civil liability unless the act 
or omission in question was ‘so unreasonable that no authority having the 
special statutory power in question could properly consider … [it] to be … 
reasonable’.136 The provision clearly applies to negligence actions and lowers 
the standard of care to be applied in determining whether a public authority 
has breached its duty of care.137 
 
 132 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 84(4). Requiring ‘reasonableness’ in the Wednesbury sense sits more 
easily with duties of reasonable care than with duties that are normally strict. But, then again, 
the logic of confining the provision to statutory, as opposed to common law, duties of care 
seems very questionable. In practice, ‘absolute’ statutory duties are fairly rare, so that the 
difference in scope between Victoria and the other jurisdictions here mentioned may  
not be great. 
 133 Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) v Rolfe [2010] NSWSC 714 (2 July 2010) [43]  
(Harrison AsJ); Patsalis v New South Wales (2012) 266 FLR 207, 228 (Basten JA); McKenna 
[2013] NSWCA 476 (23 December 2013) [167] (Macfarlan JA). 
 134 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 43A(1). 
 135 Ibid s 43A(2). 
 136 Ibid s 43A(3). 
 137 Refrigerated Roadways (2009) 77 NSWLR 360, 434 [359] (Campbell JA); Curtis (2014) 88 
NSWLR 10, 14 [5], 72 [277]. 
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Section 43A was a kneejerk legislative reaction to a very unusual negli-
gence case, Presland v Hunter Area Health Service (‘Presland’).138 That case 
attracted controversy because it allowed a disturbed psychiatric patient who 
had been released from hospital to recover damages from the hospital for the 
fact and consequences of his imprisonment when he killed his brother’s 
fiancée on the day of his release. The decision was later reversed by the Court 
of Appeal without reference to s 43A,139 but in the intervening period, the 
legislature saw fit to act. 
Referring to Presland,140 the second reading speech described the rationale 
for introducing the provision in the following terms: 
We are all aware of the extraordinary pressures doctors are facing at this time. 
The last thing we want the courts to be doing is adding to those pressures. In 
the mental health context, the Presland case has created the risk that doctors 
will behave too conservatively, detaining patients unnecessarily, out of fear that 
they can be sued by the patient for anything he or she does if not detained. 
Other decision-makers may be similarly constrained when trying to decide 
how to exercise their powers in the public interest. Therefore, the bill inserts a 
new section 43A that applies to the exercise of, or failure to exercise, a ‘special 
statutory power’. This will apply to powers that persons generally could only ex-
ercise with specific statutory authority, such as the power of a medical officer to 
detain a person under the Mental Health Act.141 
In a 2008 analysis, Professor Aronson has suggested that, given its back-
ground, the provision should be given a narrow interpretation, confining its 
application to defendants who, as in Presland itself, possess statutory authority 
to ‘act in a way that changes, creates or alters people’s legal status or rights or 
obligations without their consent’.142 
However, both the second reading speech and the text of the provision 
itself refer to local government functions more generally, and it is the exercise 
of such general functions that has in practice given rise to most of the 
litigation concerning s 43A. It was also clearly not the Ipp Review Panel’s 
intention to confine the Wednesbury unreasonableness test to the exercise of 
powers of the type that were at issue in Presland. 
 
 138 [2003] NSWSC 754 (19 August 2003). 
 139 Hunter Area Health Service v Presland (2005) 63 NSWLR 22. 
 140 [2003] NSWSC 754 (19 August 2003). 
 141 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 4 December 2003, 583–6 
(John Della Bosca). 
 142 Aronson, above n 24, 78–9. 
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The cases considering s 43A have addressed two issues that are key to 
determining the provision’s scope and operation: (i) the proper definition of a 
‘special statutory power’; and (ii) the nature and strictness of the relevant 
standard of care. On both questions there remains a good deal of uncertainty. 
As regards the first, the High Court of Australia in Sydney Water v Turano143 
did not consider s 43A in detail, merely noting the provision’s ‘uncertain’ 
scope and referring to Aronson’s interpretation of the term ‘special statutory 
power’ without necessarily endorsing its correctness.144 
Early decisions of the New South Wales Court of Appeal were also not 
definitive, focusing not on what a ‘special statutory power’ was, but rather on 
what it was not. Powers to erect safety screens on a bridge to prevent objects 
from being thrown from it,145 to install guideposts at the side of road,146 or to 
place warning signs on the road’s median strip147 have all been held not to be 
‘special statutory powers’, but simply the normal incidents of land ownership. 
In Grant v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (‘Grant’),148 Rothman J, 
adopting the reasoning of Campbell JA in Roads and Traffic Authority of New 
South Wales v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd, again considered the definition-
al question only negatively, saying that unless the term ‘special’ is to be 
regarded as otiose, a ‘special statutory power’: 
cannot be of a kind that, in circumstances not requiring statutory power, per-
sons can exercise. … [I]f the power is one that, in other circumstances, being in 
relation to private property or private conduct, would not require statutory au-
thority, the power, when granted to a statutory body (or private individual in 
relation to property or conduct of or on behalf of government) is not a special 
statutory power within s 43A(2) of the Act.149 
None of these cases, it should be noted, expressly contradict Aronson’s narrow 
construction of the provision, but neither do they explicitly endorse it. 
 
 143 (2009) 239 CLR 51. 
 144 Ibid 64–5 [23]–[26]. 
 145 Refrigerated Roadways (2009) 77 NSWLR 360, 435 [368] (Campbell JA). Although private 
citizens lack the ability to erect screens, this is not because they lack a statutory power, but 
because they do not own the land, so that their acts would constitute a trespass: at 435 [369]. 
 146 Bellingen Shire Council v Colavon Pty Ltd (2012) 188 LGERA 169, 177 [38] (Beazley JA). The 
appellant was not permitted to rely on the s 43A defence due to its late pleading: at 179 [50]. 
 147 Grant v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2014) 66 MVR 318, 345–6 [140]–[142] 
(Rothman J). 
 148 Ibid 345 [139]. 
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However, more recent decisions such as Lee v Carlton Crest Hotel (Sydney) 
Pty Ltd (‘Lee’)150 and Curtis v Harden Shire Council (‘Curtis’)151 support a 
broader interpretation. In Lee, s 43A was held to be applicable to a body’s 
statutory power to inspect and certify structures,152 and in Curtis, to a power 
to erect road signage warning drivers of the risk of loose gravel, or of the need 
to reduce their speed.153 Both powers were found to be ‘special’ on the basis 
that they existed only by virtue of the body’s statutory authority.154 This is 
more expansive than Aronson’s proposed definition, as the powers do not 
appear to have been to ‘create or alter people’s legal status or rights or obliga-
tions without their consent’.155 
The result is that courts appear to be applying s 43A well beyond the 
bounds of the type of case that provided the initiative for reform.  
Like Dalton J in Hamcor,156 they have also applied it to failings of a purely 
operational type, even when these are not themselves dictated by higher-level, 
background, policy decisions. In this detail, they again describe a realm of 
protection for public authorities that extends well beyond the Ipp Review 
Panel’s original intent. 
As regards the second question relating to the required standard of care 
under s 43A, courts engage in a two-step analysis: once a breach of duty at 
common law is established, it must then be considered whether the additional 
test is satisfied.157 The test is again derived from the administrative law 
concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness and its application in tort law has 
consequently proven difficult. One reason for this, Giles JA noted in Allianz 
Insurance Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (‘Allianz’), is that the 
concept of reasonableness in negligence law focuses on the substantive quality 
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of a decision made, not on its validity for the distinct purpose of determining 
whether a body should be obliged to take it again.158 
In Precision Products (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury City Council, Allsop P 
indicated that it was clearly Parliament’s intent to ‘ameliorate the rigours of 
the law of negligence’,159 but considered it a matter for debate whether the 
provision introduces a substantive standard of ‘gross negligence.’160 In Allianz, 
the Court of Appeal considered, but rejected, any equation between the 
standard and the public law concept of ‘irrationality’, noting that the latter 
approach could lead to excessive emphasis on a decision-maker’s state of 
mind.161 The Court declined to endorse ‘gross negligence’ as the relevant 
standard, whilst acknowledging that the provision requires unreasonableness 
at a ‘high level’.162 There again, in Grant, Rothman J also rejected public law 
interpretations of the provision that would equate it with criminal negligence 
or administrative law irrationality. Recognising that it requires a higher 
degree of negligence than the ordinary standard, his Honour was uncertain 
whether ‘gross negligence’ is the right test.163 His Honour instead suggested in 
obiter that the key question is: 
Could an authority properly consider the act or omission a reasonable exercise 
of the power? The use of the word ‘could’ does not here raise a mere possibility, 
but is intended to refer to capacity … if it is possible that an authority acting 
reasonably could perform the act, then liability is excluded.164 
The focus of this analysis is not on determining what decision should have 
been taken by an authority, but on identifying a possible range of decisions 
that a reasonable authority could properly have taken. It is only if the authori-
ty’s decision falls outside of that range that the relevant standard will have 
been breached. 
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The same sort of approach appealed recently to courts in Lee165 and Cur-
tis.166 The Court of Appeal in the latter case intimated that the test ‘envisages a 
range of opinions as to what might constitute a reasonable act or reasonable 
failure to act, but asks if no public authority properly considering the issue 
could place it within that range’, viewing the matter not through the court’s 
own eyes, but through those eyes of a responsible public authority.167 
There consequently appears to be considerable awkwardness about the 
public law roots of the test in s 43A and a desire on the part of courts to sever 
it from them, so as to treat the provision as if it were sui generis. This awk-
wardness mirrors the decline in popularity of public law tests for negligence 
liability that we witnessed at common law and reflects, we suggest, the same 
underlying concerns about them. There are also some interesting parallels in 
recent cases between the way in which s 43A is being interpreted and the 
Bolam standard applied at common law to expert decision-making. It is true 
that in the Queensland case of Hamcor, Dalton J was very clear that the 
relevant statutory standard was lower than the Bolam standard.168 By contrast, 
in Curtis, Bathurst CJ mentions Bolam in parenthesis, alongside the s 43A 
approach.169 The language used in both Grant and Curtis suggests that courts 
consider the private law analogy to be the more appropriate one, but that the 
standard imposed under s 43A is still somewhat lower than under Bolam — 
that is, compliance with the practice of any reasonable authority sufficing to 
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make the public body safe, as opposed to compliance with a ‘responsible body’ 
of opinion. 
If certainty of legal standards is to be a measure of the success of post-Ipp 
Review legislative reform, then this discussion of s 43A indicates that victory 
is still a long way off. One possible way of resolving matters and clarifying the 
law, which we canvas further in Part V, might lie in abandoning Wednesbury 
altogether and embracing instead the Bolam approach in relation to discre-
tionary public body decisions. It is not clear on current authority whether that 
approach is sensibly achievable without doing damage to the language and 
intent of s 43A. This means that if this type of approach is desired, it may be 
best to start again from scratch. 
4 Western Australia 
The Western Australian iteration of the policy defence most closely resembles 
the original Ipp Review recommendation. Section 5X of the Civil Liability Act 
2002 (WA) states that: 
In a claim for damages for harm caused by the fault of a public body or officer 
arising out of fault in the performance or non-performance of a public func-
tion, a policy decision cannot be used to support a finding that the defendant 
was at fault unless the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable public 
body or officer in the defendant’s position could have made it. 
This mimics most of the key elements of the original proposal (including the 
focus on public functions and policy decisions), and the definition of the type 
of ‘policy decision’ protected is the same.170 The provision does not provide a 
defence as such, but rather acts as a direction to courts that a policy decision 
cannot be used to support a finding of fault unless the conditions of the 
section are met.171 It clearly applies to negligence proceedings and further 
extends, by virtue of s 5Y, to claims for breach of statutory duty in the way 
that the Ipp Review recommended. It does, however, extend beyond the Ipp 
Review recommendations insofar as it captures not just claims for personal 
injury and death, but also for property damage and economic loss.172 
The only judicial interpretation of s 5X to date is to be found in Southern 
Properties (WA) Pty Ltd v Executive Director, Department of Conservation and 
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Land Management [No 2],173 where the plaintiff vineyard owner failed in a 
negligence action for economic loss suffered when its grapes were tainted by 
smoke from a fire started by the defendant as part of a controlled burn 
operation that went awry. The primary basis on which the claim was rejected 
at both first instance and by the Court of Appeal was that any common law 
duty of care in respect of the relevant operations would be inconsistent with 
the defendant’s statutory functions.174 At first instance, however, Murphy J 
had also indicated in obiter that the action would have been precluded by s 5X 
because the defendant’s decision to undertake the burn was a policy decision 
based on social and political factors,175 and its conduct had not breached the 
relevant standard.176 The Court of Appeal concurred that the decision was one 
of policy,177 but split on the question whether the relevant standard would 
have been breached. McLure JA thought that it would not have been,178 whilst 
Pullin JA concluded that it had been and that a negligence action should lie.179 
Even here, where the form of legislation most closely replicates the rec-
ommendations of the Ipp Review, there are clearly problems in interpreting 
how to implement the relevant statutory standard. The majority took the view 
that s 5X ‘operates so as to significantly alter the otherwise applicable standard 
of care at common law’,180 adverting directly to the Wednesbury public law 
standard. On this view, it was ‘wrong to equate that standard with the general 
law standard of care in negligence.’181 By contrast, Pullin JA appears to have 
suggested that the process of deciding whether a decision breaches s 5X is 
similar to that involved in weighing the various considerations under s 5B(2) 
of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA).182 Section 5B(2) is a version of the 
general provision introduced into most civil liability legislation across 
Australia that requires courts, in assessing breach in any case, to consider the 
probability and likely seriousness of harm, as well as the burden of taking 
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precautions and the social utility of the defendant’s activity.183 Applying these 
factors, Pullin JA found the relevant standard to have been breached.184 
Pullin JA’s interpretation of s 5X diverges dramatically from the approach 
of most New South Wales courts185 and comes close to equiparating the 
approach under the Western Australian provision with the standard approach 
to breach questions existing at common law. As a dissenting opinion in the 
sole case to date on this issue, it seems doubtful that Pullin JA’s approach will 
be followed, but the very fact of his Honour’s divergence from the majority 
approach validates the predictions of commentators that the Wednesbury 
approach can all too easily shade back into the more standard private law 
requirement of fault. The irony of the case, from our own critical point of 
view, is that the answer to the question of whether the relevant standard 
under s 5X had been breached seems to have been no easier to predict than 
the question of whether the defendant owed a duty of care at common law. 
Section 5X was not needed on the facts to provide the protection required, 
and closer hypothetical inquiry into its potential application on the facts 
required very detailed examination of the evidence and was evidently capable 
of yielding radical disagreement even amongst the most intelligent of minds. 
V  B AC K  T O  T H E  DR AW I N G  BOA R D 
Two criticisms of the common law underpinned the recent drive for the 
reform of public authority negligence liability in Australia — the idea that 
liabilities in respect of policy and resourcing decisions were excessive and 
adversely affecting authorities’ discharge of their functions; and the distinct 
but associated concern that they were complex and unpredictable. Our 
analysis of the common law position in Part II of this article raises a serious 
question mark against the first of these assumptions.186 There is more sub-
stance in the second, owing to the multiplicity and complexity of considera-
tions that have tended to enter court judgments on duty questions at common 
law, the flexibility of the modern multifactorial approach in Australia, and the 
fact-intensive nature of inquiries regarding breach. The ironic truth, however, 
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is that the complexities and inconsistencies of public authority liability have 
dramatically increased, not decreased, in the wake of the Ipp Review. 
Whilst the Ipp Review’s recommendations were expressly intended to 
promote consistency in the law across Australia,187 we now have at least five 
different approaches to liability in play across the country. This outcome was 
regarded as undesirable even by governments that commissioned the Ipp 
Review, and in our view, it remains morally objectionable for reasons earlier 
canvased.188 It is one thing to suggest that local taxation rates may justifiably 
differ across the country, yet quite another to suggest that the right to sue for 
harm caused by government to basic private interests should do so. Whatever 
the uncertainties of the common law, these were at least the uncertainties of a 
single system of thinking about private law rights. That system is now overlaid 
in the majority of jurisdictions with a further set of statutory rules, the 
substance of which varies from place to place. The law is a ragged patchwork, 
sewn by a dozen different hands. 
There is also little evidence that the introduction of lower, more protective 
standards for public body decisions is likely to yield any greater certainty in 
terms of bright line standards than already existed at common law, even if it 
serves to further reduce liability in some cases. Authorities may perhaps be 
assured that claims are now even more likely to fail than they were prior to 
the reforms, but are they really in a better position to predict when this will 
be? The current confusion attending both the provisions’ scope and the 
precise operation and meaning of the various statutory standards has not 
created any bright lines. The confusion stems in part from trying to model 
private law liability rules by reference to public law concepts originally 
designed for quite different purposes, but it is also a consequence of poor 
drafting, the malleability of the concepts themselves and the fact that they 
operate at lower levels of inquiry regarding breach of duty. Indeed, if absolute 
certainties are the key priority (which we doubt), then the best solution would 
be to rule out primary liabilities for public authorities altogether in respect of 
particular fields of activity through a scheme of immunity. This is the only 
sure-fire way of ensuring that detailed and difficult inquiries about the 
‘reasonableness’ or otherwise of decisions are not entered into, but it would fly 
directly in the face of the progressive abolition of government immunities in 
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tort and the respectable Diceyan tradition upon which that movement has 
historically been based.189 
There are also good reasons to question the rationality of many of the 
individual ‘policy defence’ reforms in their own right, even if one were to 
tolerate their inconsistencies. In Queensland, Tasmania, Victoria and the 
ACT, the defence is bizarrely restricted to claims for breach of statutory duty, 
providing protection so narrow that it is of little practical use to authorities in 
any event. At the same time, amending the legislation in these jurisdictions to 
incorporate negligence claims, as originally intended, would paradoxically 
give public bodies much wider protection than the Ipp Review Panel ever 
considered appropriate because, if Dalton J in Hamcor is correct,190 these 
defences apply to ‘policy’ decisions and ‘operational’ failings alike. This either 
misconstrues, or purposely ignores, the parameters of the Ipp Review’s 
recommendations and steps far beyond the bounds of protection provided at 
common law. The controversy of this step, to which we allude further below, 
cautions against it in the absence of clear empirical evidence of some pressing 
social need for it to be taken. 
In New South Wales, where the defence clearly does apply to negligence 
actions, there is also evidence that protection controversially applies to 
failings of a purely operational type; and there is much confusion about the 
standard of care that the defence imposes. Judges generally take the view that 
it is inappropriate to apply a public law Wednesbury unreasonableness 
standard to private law actions, whilst recognising that this was the Ipp 
Review Panel’s intention and that the language of the legislation comes close 
to replicating it. The response of courts in cases such as Grant,191 Curtis192 and 
Lee193 seems to have been to interpret the legislation in a ‘private law’ way that 
imposes a standard analogous to the Bolam test applicable at common law to 
expert, professional decisions. In Western Australia, the interpretive fate of 
the test remains unclear. The one decided authority juxtaposes two very 
different styles of approach — the application of a public law Wednesbury 
standard without gloss, on the one hand, and a much more generous ap-
proach analogous to the normal negligence standard, on the other. 
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These inconsistencies, confusions and difficulties suggest to us that the 
negligence liability of public authorities in Australia needs to be urgently 
revisited and that its current ailments sadly cannot be fully cured simply 
through more creative approaches to statutory interpretation, as Professor 
Vines has hopefully suggested.194 In the remaining space, we cannot hope to 
set out a full proposal for reform, but canvas two main options that are now 
worthy of more detailed consideration. 
A  Option 1: Revert to the Common Law 
The first is to repeal all versions of the policy defence195 and return liability 
questions entirely to the common law. Although this might appear a back-
ward step, a singular approach would still undoubtedly be simpler and would 
have clear benefits over the current statutory patchwork in terms of consisten-
cy and equality of treatment for victims. Our analysis in Part II of this article 
revealed that the common law already has robust protections in place for 
decisions of a legislative, quasi-legislative or policy type, and that it has a 
sophisticated set of tools available to it which balances plaintiff interests 
against countervailing policy concerns. These have resulted in courts respect-
fully avoiding the second-guessing of decisions they feel incapable of judging, 
and being sensitive to the resourcing constraints that public authorities often 
face. No doubt improvements to some of these rules could be made to 
organise them better and harden up their edges — the current form of 
discretionary balancing exercise that sometimes goes on in novel cases 
regarding the duty of care question seems almost intolerable. Greater assur-
ance regarding which ‘factors’ are necessary (rather than simply relevant) to 
the existence of a duty of care in respect of the exercise of statutory functions 
would also greatly assist. In any event, however, the common law is alert to 
the concerns that governments have historically voiced. Coupled with doubt 
as to the genuine necessity for legislative reform in the first place and the 
more recent recovery of liability insurance markets, this could provide a 
sound rationale for legislative repeal. 
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B  Option 2: Uniform Legislation and the Bolam Standard 
If the common law is thought too slow, unresponsive, undemocratic or 
necessarily too uncertain to develop a clear and stable position on this 
controversial question, an alternative would be to enact uniform legislation in 
all jurisdictions. There is precedent for this approach in the uniform defama-
tion statutes that have sprung up across Australia since 2006,196 although that 
body of legislation has itself been criticised as having been drafted too hastily 
and with inadequate reflection.197 These experiences, and the anomalies we 
have identified amongst the post-Ipp Review reforms, indicate that any 
process toward a uniform statutory norm needs to be very carefully consid-
ered, involve clear drafting and take full account of the protections and 
principles that already exist for public bodies at common law. There is no 
sense in simply replicating under statute a regime of protection already extant 
at common law. Nor is it helpful, in our view, to introduce a regime that is 
different to the common law in respects so marginal as to be practically 
insignificant. That merely increases complexity without improving utility. 
The chances of persuading governments to revisit the topic of public liabil-
ity so soon seems remote in the current political and economic climate, but if 
the uniform legislation route is chosen, there is then a more fundamental 
question that will need to be answered: what form should legislative protec-
tion for public authorities take? One possibility is to bring all jurisdictions 
into line with Western Australia, whose provisions most closely reflect the 
recommendation of the Ipp Review. The central problem with this provision, 
so far as we can see, is its persistent fidelity to the Wednesbury unreasonable-
ness test, which has been vehemently criticised and proven hard to apply.198 
Demonstrating that decisions lie outside of a body’s power, or discretion 
(which is the purpose and effect of determination of Wednesbury unreasona-
bleness) does not logically bear on whether or not it was negligent; and if the 
concern about imposing duties of care on decisions made within discretion is 
that to do so would undermine an immunity or privilege that was intended by 
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Parliament, then it is already the position at common law that duties of care 
will not be permitted to contradict statutory intentions. 
An alternative approach, requiring abandonment of the troublesome pub-
lic law concept, would be to endorse the Bolam test that applies in respect of 
complex clinical decisions at common law. This test is now approximated 
throughout Australia in civil liability legislation dealing with professional 
standards more generally,199 and has also been applied in the UK to public 
decisions of an expert nature, such as those relating to the provision of 
educational200 and emergency services.201 The test could viably be extended to 
discretionary public decisions more generally. Indeed, there are some clear 
analogies between decisions of the professional and public type: both involve 
the exercise of discretions in respect of limited resources, and both may be 
difficult for judges to appraise owing to their lack of expertise regarding the 
subject matter and the subjectivity of some of the criteria involved. In both 
cases, a more deferential approach may legitimately serve to protect the 
development of innovative public service practices that may have longer-term 
public benefits. 
If this route were to be taken, one option would be to confine the use of 
the Bolam standard to decisions of a ‘policy’ type, as originally defined by the 
Ipp Review Panel — that is, to discretionary decisions taken in the exercise of 
public functions that involve the allocation of scarce resources, or the making 
of decisions that involve balancing private and public interests.202 This would 
then effectively implement the current Western Australian approach coun-
trywide, but would ground it in a private law standard, rather than a public 
law one. It would provide a more deferential approach to decisions about 
whether to allocate funds to healthcare rather than road safety, but would 
normally result in the ordinary negligence standard being applied to a 
decision about where to locate a warning sign on the side of a road, or the 
carelessness of a prison warden in leaving a cell door open, thereby allowing a 
prisoner to escape. 
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Another possibility would be to extend the Bolam approach to any exer-
cise, or failure to exercise, a discretionary ‘public’ function. This would accord 
additional deference to discretionary public body decisions of both a policy 
and operational type, wherever the body in question is acting solely in their 
statutory capacity, as opposed to exercising powers or capacities that are 
shared by private individuals or corporations. It would hence apply to protect 
prison guards acting in restraint of prisoners, or police officers firing a gun at 
an armed assailant,203 but not to council employees driving a motor vehicle, or 
servicing the motor vehicle fleet. 
Either of these models is a viable possibility, although our preliminary 
view is that the former provides the wiser starting point since it is narrower 
and derogates less significantly from private rights; it addresses the area about 
which governments themselves originally expressed most concern and the 
liability insurance ‘crisis’ now appears to have passed.204 On either approach, a 
public body would not breach any duty of care owed if it acted in a way that 
(at the time the decision was taken) was ‘widely accepted … by a significant 
number of respected [public bodies] in the field as competent … practice’,205 
unless that body of supporting opinion lacked a rational evidential basis, or 
was contrary to written law.206 
Taking a Bolam approach to public body decision-making is arguably 
consistent, we have suggested, with the way in which the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal is currently interpreting the standard under s 43A of the 
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), although that conclusion must be expressed 
with some caution, and the Bolam standard may be slightly more generous to 
plaintiffs.207 Endorsing it would be methodologically distinct from imposing a 
substantive standard of ‘gross negligence’208 (‘faute lourde’ in French law) but 
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is probably unlikely to yield significantly different results in practice. It would 
also still require reference to detailed evidence and a fact-intensive inquiry, 
and the law would still have some soft edges, since, as we know all too well 
from the common law, defining a policy decision (on the first model) or a 
public function (under both models) is difficult.209 It would also still be 
impossible to know for sure in advance whether a public body was safe from 
liability in its practices, although we suggest that the Bolam standard would 
provide actors with a reasonable degree of assurance. If accompanied by 
existing provisions which subjectivise210 the standard of care so as to take into 
account available public revenues, it would afford a significant basis for public 
authority confidence. 
One question that will remain if the Bolam approach is pursued is whether 
a still more protective approach, akin to an absolute immunity, is warranted 
in respect of certain types of policy decision on grounds of their constitution-
al non-justiciability. That immunity, it seems to us, already exists in respect of 
some decisions at common law (for example, in respect of decisions of a local 
government about whether or not to legislate) and no further statutory 
tinkering is therefore likely to be needed, if it is still considered desirable. We 
tend to the view that some such additional immunities are probably warrant-
ed, but that the range of decisions protected in this way against judicial 
scrutiny ought to be relatively narrow, as it now is at common law in both the 
UK and Australia. This view is premised on the ideal that only the most 
central governmental functions should be immune to judicial scrutiny on a 
constitutional basis in the modern age. The final result would then be a 
narrow band of constitutionally non-justiciable decisions, a broader band of 
discretionary public decisions subjected to the Bolam standard under one of 
the two models suggested above, and (at the lowest level) a set of decisions 
judged by reference to the normal negligence standard. Selection between the 
two different models of Bolam protection identified will produce protection of 
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eration of its merits lie beyond the scope of the current piece, but it is unlikely, we suggest, to 
yield significantly different results to the one we here propose, requiring as it does a ‘very 
clear departure from ordinary standards of care and skill’: D v East Berkshire Community 
Health NHS Trust [2005] 2 WLR 993, 1015 [49] (Lord Bingham). 
 209 For discussion of some of the intractable difficulties in cleanly separating ‘public’ and ‘private’ 
domains see, eg, William Lucy and Alexander Williams, ‘Public and Private: Neither Deep 
nor Meaningful?’ in Kit Barker and Darryn Jensen (eds), Private Law: Key Encounters with 
Public Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 45. 
 210 It is possible that this subjectivised standard should apply only to cases of pure omission, as 
has tended to be the case at common law: see above n 103; Nolan, ‘Varying the Standard of 
Care in Negligence’, above n 93, 670–2. 
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radically different scope. As we have intimated above, our preference for 
caution and against derogating from private law rights leads us to suggest that 
the narrower model ought to be adopted in the first instance in the absence of 
clear empirical evidence that anything more radical is needed. This would 
leave the normal negligence standard applying not just to decisions made by a 
public body when acting in a private capacity (for example, in driving  
or servicing a car), but also to operational aspects of the exercise of its 
uniquely public functions. 
VI  C O N C LU SI O N  
Sometimes the only realistic line of advance lies in retracing one’s steps. 
Whilst the principles that attach to public body liability for negligence are 
complex and difficult, the legislative responses to the Ipp Review’s recommen-
dations are, we have argued, unacceptable in their current form, serving only 
to increase inconsistency, deny equality of treatment to tort victims and 
introduce new irrationalities and uncertainties into the law. Recent experienc-
es of the legislation in action demonstrate that it is time to start again: tabula 
rasa. If any special, statutory standard of care is to be applied to policy 
decisions in Australian negligence actions, it is not, we have suggested, the 
Wednesbury public law standard, but rather a standard akin to that which 
already applies to analogous, expert, discretionary decision-makers in the 
private law. Alternatively, the time may have come to abandon hope of 
uniform legislative solutions, to simply undo what has been done, and to once 
more trust our courts to do a rather better job. 
